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The ethnic makeup of the popula-
tion significantly affects the domestic 
policy of any state, and its relations 
with neighbouring countries. Although 
interactions with ethnic minorities are 
not as urgent a problem in Lithuania as 
they are in the two other Baltic States, 
ethnicity-related conflicts continue to 
occur, particularly, as regards the rela-
tions between the Lithuanian state and 
the Polish minority, which is the larg-
est in the country. The Polish minori-
ty—Lithuania—Poland relations are 
not the only factor that affects the situ-
ation of the Poles in Lithuania. The 
other important factors are Lithuania 
and Poland’ EU membership, the rela-
tions between Lithuania and Russia, 
and the Russian minority in Lithuania. 
Our analysis shows that the EU mem-
bership of Lithuania and Poland did 
not provide an instant solution to the 
problem of the Polish minority but ra-
ther attenuated it. Although the EU 
factor played a significant role before 
the accession of Poland and Lithuania 
to the Union, its influence is very lim-
ited today. The effect of the Russian 
factor is different. Strained Polish-
Russian relations do not affect the re-
lations between the Polish and Russian 
minorities in Lithuania. On the contra-
ry, both minorities collaborate on a 
wide range of issues. 
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are considered the key to peace and democracy in Europe [1, p. 5—
16]. European countries have worked out many mechanisms, which 
are used to manage ethnic minority problems. European govern-
ments react very differently to national security problems, domestic 
political competition, political representation, and economic redis-
tribution. Moreover, the situation of ethnic minorities is an im-
portant gauge of the development of a liberal democratic system. 
This applies even more so to the states where nation-building has 
not been completed. 
In Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), most ethnic groups have 
close ties with their neighbouring ‘countries of origin’. This may 
cause considerable tension between states and increase the risk of in-
ternational conflicts. Although the constitutions of all ‘new’ EU 
member states, which have acceded the EU since 2004, protect the 
rights of ethnic (national) minorities, the situation of the latter differs 
significantly from country to country in CEE [2, p. 40]. 
All the above equally applies to the Baltics. Overall, the situation 
of ethnic minorities in Lithuania is regarded as more favourable than 
that in the neighbouring Latvia and Estonia. Despite the relatively 
low level of discrimination in the country, Lithuania’s Polish and 
Russian minorities complain about discrimination from the Lithuani-
an government as regards a number of issues, including the insuffi-
cient financing of minority educational and cultural institutions, 
Lithuanisation of Polish names, and renaming streets in Polish com-
munities. However, unlike those in Estonia and Latvia, national mi-
norities in Lithuania were granted citizenship immediately after in-
dependence, and they have never faced an outright discriminatory 
passport policy. 
In this article, we will examine the situation of the Polish minority 
in Lithuania. The historical development of CEE countries resulted in 
incongruence between ethnic nations and states. At the same time, for 
the peoples of these countries, congruence between ethnic groups 
and states is an ideal and evidence of the maturity and sovereignty of 
a nation-state. This approach is fraught with disappointment, tension, 
and conflicts. Rogers Brubaker has proposed to rely on several prem-
ises when studying the triangle of relations between the state pursu-
ing nation-building, the ethnic minority living in this state, and the 
‘country of origin’ of the minority. His approach identifies the com-
pletion of nation-building and the attainment of full-fledged state-
hood as priorities for a state pursuing nation-building. Ethnic minori-
ties call for the state to recognise their special ethnic identity and 
grant them special cultural and political rights. In our research, this 
applies to the Polish minority in Lithuania. At the same time, minori-
ties strive for recognition as full members of the ethnic nation of the 
‘state of origin’. Poland is not an exception [2]. Brubaker’s model 
provides a suitable framework for our analysis since it suggests ex-
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amining relations between the three most significant actors. Howev-
er, a limitation of this model is that it relies on the assumption of a 
closed system (two states and a minority). In reality, this system is 
open to external influences. Therefore, we supplement Brubaker’s 
model with two factors, which we consider essential. These are Lith-
uania’s Russian minority and the country’s geographic proximity to 
Russia. We maintain that the situation of an ethnic minority within a 
nation-state and the structure of its interests are affected by both the 
relations between the three principal actors and external factors (the 
EU and Russia, in our case). This makes relations and interconnec-
tions even more complex and less predictable. 
The structure of this article is as follows. The first three sections 
focus on relations between the three main actors: between Lithuania 
and Poland, the Polish minority and the Lithuanian state, and be-
tween the minority and the ‘country of origin’ — Poland. The fourth 
section of the article analyses limitations and opportunities for the 
three actors relating to Lithuania and Poland’s EU membership. The 
fifth section considers the role of the Russian factor (and the Russian 
minority) in Lithuania from the perspective of its effect on the situation 
of the Polish minority. In the conclusion, we summarise the findings. 
 
Lithuania and Poland: intergovernmental relations 
 
Relations between Lithuania and Poland escape a clear-cut def-
inition. On the one hand, they are allies, members of NATO and the 
EU, which suggest a high level of mutual political loyalty. On the other 
hand, there are historically embedded differences between these coun-
tries. These concern the problem of Vilnius and the Vilnius region and 
Lithuania’s policy towards ethnic minorities [3, pp. 18—24]. 
Relations between these countries are affected by their historical 
background. Firstly, Lithuania and Poland once constituted one 
state — the Polish—Lithuanian Commonwealth. The Commonwealth 
was established by the Union of Lublin in 1569. Lithuanians consider 
it a dark page in the history of their state since the Union granted 
greater rights and possibilities to the Polish nobility than to the Lith-
uanian aristocracy [4, pp. 63—67]. 
Secondly, an important historical landmark in relations between 
Lithuania and Poland was the inter-war period (1917—1940), espe-
cially its end. Lithuania faced a serious crisis after the beginning of 
World War II. In 1939—1940, the country had to receive over 27,000 
refugees from Poland. Both Polish refugees and the Soviet-supported 
return of Vilnius in October 1939, which followed the occupation of 
Poland, had a profound effect on Lithuania’s policy towards Polish 
migrants [5, pp. 461—462]. This made conflict-free relations between 
Lithuania and Poland or Lithuania pursuing an equitable policy to-
wards the Polish minority very unlikely. A series of discriminatory 
measures against Poles living in Lithuania was introduced in 1940. 
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Approximately 83 thousand Poles were deprived of their civil rights. 
All the refugees who had not been able to register were imprisoned — 
many of them were Poles. Vilnius was consistently Lithuanised. Any 
measure aimed at reducing the political participation of refugees 
(and, later, all newcomers) or at cutting refugee support spending 
was welcome [5, p. 462, 465, 468, 474]. All this was happening against 
the background of the war raging in Europe and the allies condemn-
ing Lithuania’s policy towards refugees. 
Today, both countries are members of NATO and the EU. Ties be-
tween Poland and Lithuania are very close across many fields — mili-
tary, economic, political, and others. Moreover, the two countries have 
developed bilateral ties within various institutions: advisory bodies, 
parliamentary exchanges, etc. These collaborations focus primarily on 
cross-border issues and culture. The bilateral efforts between Lithuania 
and Poland include the Advisory Committee of the Presidents of Po-
land and Lithuania, the Parliamentary Assembly of Poland and Lithu-
ania (established in 1997), and the International Commission on Cross-
Border Cooperation between Lithuania and Poland (1996) [3, p. 20]. 
Moreover, Poland and Lithuania collaborate on issues concerning rela-
tions with the Russian Federation. The ties between the two states owe 
their strength to the fact that their collaborations are supported by in-
stitutions of both executive and legislative power at both intergov-
ernmental and local levels. However, close cooperation does not cancel 
problems in bilateral relations, the Vilnius issue being the most com-
plicated one. From the early 20th century, the two countries were laying 
their claims to Vilno (today’s Vilnius and its environs [6]. In 1920, Po-
land managed to occupy temporarily these territories. This resulted in 
the severance of diplomatic ties between the states. Researchers have 
emphasised that the Vilno conflict and the ensuing occupation of the city 
by Polish troops were a result of tensions that had been accumulating for 
decades because of the inequitable distribution of rights, privileges, and 
representation between the two nations in the commonwealth of Poland 
and Lithuania [7, p. 21]. This conflict caused Lithuanians to develop a 
special attitude towards surrounding larger countries and to preserve 
jealously their identity and territory. 
Nevertheless, after the demise of the Soviet Union, Lithuania and 
Poland managed to find common grounds for building good-
neighbourly relations. In 1994, the two countries signed a treaty on 
good-neighbourly relations and cooperation. Articles 13, 14, and 15 of 
the document ensure equal rights to the Lithuanian and Polish minori-
ties living in Poland and Lithuania respectively.1 
                                                     
1 1994, Lietuvos Respublikos ir Lenkijos Respublikos draugisku santykiu ir gero 
kaimyninio bendradarbiavimo sutartis [Treaty between Lithuania and Poland 
on Friendly Relations and Good-Neighbourly Cooperation], available at 
https://e-seimas.lrs.lt/portal/legalAct/lt/TAD/TAIS.11154 (accessed 29 
August 2018). (In Lith.) 
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Lithuania and the Polish minority 
 
An inseparable part of Lithuania’s population, the Polish diaspora 
is the largest ethnic minority in the country. In 2009, Poles accounted 
for 6.1 % of the national population. Vilnius and the Vilnius region are 
home to the greatest proportion of the minority — approximately 
200,000 people.2 The dynamics of population change in Lithuania in 
2011—2018 suggests that, despite a continuous decline in both the total 
population and national minorities in Lithuania, the percentage of the 
Polish population of the country remains at 6 %. In 2001, Lithuania’s 
population was 3,483,972 people, 234,989 of them were Poles (6.7 % of 
the total population).3 Ten years later, in 2011, the total population de-
creased to 3,043,429 people, whereas the number of Poles was 200,317 
people (6.6 %).4 In the first decade of the 21st century, the total number 
of Poles decreased by 14.8 %. By 2018, the total population of Lithuania 
reduced to 2,800,738 people5 (the 2016—2018 statistics suggest the 
Lithuania population decreased from 2,870,351 to 2,800,738 people6). 
However, the number of Polish population remained significant in rel-
evant terms — at approximately 6 %. The reduction in the number of 
Poles living in Lithuania, which was observed over the past fourteen 
years, is accounted for by the country’s accession to the EU. The borders 
were opened for free movement, and records of exits were not tracked 
anymore. This means that the Polish population of Lithuania is a signifi-
cant factor in the politics, economy, and social life of the state. 
Associated with a range of problems, this factor has a negative ef-
fect on relations between Lithuania and Poland. As early as 1995, the 
                                                     
2 In 2011, Vilnius was home to 88,000 Poles (16.5% of the total population), 
and Poles accounted for the 60% of the total population of the Vilnius re-
gion. 2009, Lietuvos gyventojai 2009 metais. 2009 m. gyventoju sarasymo 
duomenys [2009 census in Lithuania], Lietuvos statistikos departamentas, 
available at https://osp.stat.gov.lt/gyventojai1 (accessed 1 August 2018). 
(In Lith.) 
3 2001, Lietuvos gyventojai 2001 metais. 2001 m. gyventoju sarasymo 
duomenys [2001 census in Lithuania], Lietuvos statistikos departamentas, 
available at https://osp.stat.gov.lt/gyventojai1 (accessed 1 August 2018). 
(In Lith.) 
4 2011, Lietuvos gyventojai 2011 metais. 2011 m. gyventoju sarasymo 
duomenys [2011 census in Lithuania], Lietuvos statistikos departamentas, 
available at http://statistics.bookdesign.lt/esu_04.htm?lang=lt (accessed 1 
August 2018). (In Lith.) 
5 2018, Lietuvos gyventojai 2018 metais. 2018 m. gyventoju sarasymo 
duomenys [2018 census in Lithuania], Lietuvos statistikos departamentas, 
available at https://osp.stat.gov.lt/gyventojai1 (accessed 1 August 2018). 
(In Lith.) 
6 2016, Lietuvos gyventojai 2016 metais. 2016 m. gyventoju sarasymo 
duomenys [2016 census in Lithuania], Lietuvos statistikos departamentas, 




EU adopted the Balladur Plan, which obligated candidate countries 
to approach a solution to national minority problems by concluding 
bilateral agreements with their neighbours [8]. In 1994, Poland and 
Lithuania, which would accede to the EU simultaneously in 2004, 
signed a bilateral agreement. The document ensured the possibilities 
of obtaining an education in Polish in Polish-populated areas of Lith-
uania and installing bilateral street signs in these regions, as well as 
the preservation of the original Polish spelling of names in official 
Lithuania documents [9]. However, the problem has not been solved. 
Lithuania pursues a tough policy towards national minorities, espe-
cially the Polish one. It is becoming increasingly more difficult for 
minorities to get an education in their native languages. The Lithua-
nian government has introduced a number of restrictions relating to 
national minorities. In 2011, the number of schools having a right to 
teach in the languages of national minorities decreased. This hap-
pened soon after the adoption of the new law on education. The law 
increased the number of hours of the Lithuanian language. Among 
other things, history and geography had to be taught in Lithuanian 
even at minorities’ schools.7 Obviously, the policy followed by the 
Lithuanian authorities is at odds with the 1994 bilateral agreement 
and the Constitution of Lithuania. Article 27 of the latter guarantees 
the right of minorities for the preservation of their native languages, 
as well as for obtaining an education in these languages.8 
On the other hand, the Lithuanian state is very liberal when it 
comes to ethnic organisations and political alliances. In this country, 
it is permitted to establish political parties based on the ethnic princi-
ple. The largest of these political groups are the Lithuanian Union of 
Russians, the Russian Alliance, and the Electoral Action of Poles in 
Lithuania. These parties have formed a bloc to promote the interests 
of ethnic minorities more effectively. 
The Electoral Action of Poles traditionally receives the percentage of 
the vote that roughly corresponds to the proportion of the Polish popu-
lation in the country (5—7 %). In the 2016 Seimas election, the Electoral 
Action of Poles won three seats (5.84 % of votes) together with the Chris-
tian Families Alliance.9 The party’s greatest success was achieved in the 
regional and municipal elections in Vilnius and the Vilnius region: 31 
                                                     
7 2011, Lietuvos Respublikos svietimo istatymo pakeitimo istatymas [Changing 
Law on Lithuania’s Education Law], available at https://e-seimas.lrs.lt/ 
portal/legalAct/lt/TAD/TAIS.395105 (accessed 29 August 2018). (In Lith.) 
8 Lietuvos Respublikos Konstitucija [The Constitution of Lithuania], availa-
ble at: http://www3.lrs.lt/home/Konstitucija/Konstitucija.htm#II_SKI 
RSNIS_ŽMOGUS_IR_VALSTYBĖ (accessed 29 August 2018). (In Lith.) 
9 2016, 2016 m. Seimo rinkimu rezultatai [Lithuanian parliament election-
2016 results], available at: http://www.vrk.lt/2016-seimo/rezultatai 
?srcUrl=/rinkimai/102/1/1304/rezultatai/lt/rezultataiSuvestine1.html 
(accessed 29 August 2018). (In Lith.) 
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and 41 seats respectively were won by members of the Electoral Action 
of Poles in Lithuania. This is quite logical since Vilnius and the Vilnius 
region are home to more than half of Lithuania’s Poles.10 
The good neighbourly relations developed by Lithuania and Po-
land at the level of institutional collaborations do not attenuate the 
harsh rhetoric of Lithuanian politicians against politically active 
members of the Polish diaspora. 
For example, in 2014, the future Prime Minister of Lithuania, Al-
girdas Butkevičius, deprecated the claims of the leader of the Elec-
toral Action of Poles, Valdemar Tomaševski, who, not without a rea-
son, accused the Lithuanian government of pursuing a dis-
criminatory policy towards the Polish diaspora living in the country. 
Butkevičius both rejected the allegation of the leader of Lithuanian 
Poles and accused him of lacking politics culture. The President of 
Lithuania, Dalia Grybauskaitė, denounced Tomaševski for trying to 
discredit Lithuania in the international arena.11 In one of his inter-
views, Tomaševski said that, although he always tried to participate 
in the dialogue with other politicians, all his attempts to do so with 
President Grybauskaitė were futile since she ‘dismisses any alterna-
tive opinion and has to be the only one in the right’.12 The same year, 
the Electoral Action of Poles was excluded from the ruling coalition 
[10]. Earlier, they had been forbidden from presenting a bill on na-
tional minorities to the Seimas. Commenting on this, the leader of the 
Electoral Action of Poles faction, Rita Tamašunienė, said that the coa-
lition partners of the party had revealed their true face.13 
The points raised by Tomaševski in 2014 were no news. In 2010, 
the US Department of State published a report on human rights prac-
tices across the world. The document stated that Lithuania’s govern-
                                                     
10 2015, 2015 m. Lietuvos Respublikos savivaldybiu tarybu rinkimu rezultatai 
[Lithuanian local parliaments election-2015 results], available at: http:// 
www.vrk.lt/statiniai/puslapiai/2015_savivaldybiu_tarybu_rinkimai/ou
tput_lt/rinkimu_diena/stat1.html (accessed 29 August 2018). (In Lith.) 
11 2014, PM Butkevicius evaluates Tomasevski’s EP statements as ‘lack of 
political culture’, Lietuvos nacionalinis radijas ir televizija [Lithuania’s na-
tional radio and television], available at: https://www.lrt.lt/en/news-
in-english/29/33922/pm-butkevicius-evaluates-tomasevski-s-ep-statem 
ents-as-lack-of-political-culture (accessed 4 November 2018). 
12 2014, V. Tomasevski is chasing D. Grybauskate after Strasbourg: she will 
be ashamed if I tell what she has commented on, DELFI Zinios [DELFI 
News], available at: https://www.delfi.lt/news/daily/europietis/d-gry 
bauskaite-po-strasbura-vaikesis-v-tomasevskis-jai-bus-geda-jei-pasa kysiu-
ka-ji-komentavo.d?id=63750742 (accessed 4 November 2018). (In Lith.) 
13 2014, Meanness and Cynicism in Lithuania: Baltic States in Polish Mass 
Media, REGNUM, available at: https://regnum.ru/news/polit/1817 
157.html (accessed 4 November 2018). (In Russ.) 
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mental responses to ethnic discrimination were ineffective and that 
insufficient attention was given to the problem. In 2009, there was not 
a single representative of ethnic minorities in the Seimas or the Gov-
ernment. Although Lithuania adopted a national anti-discriminatory 
programme for 2009—2011, the situation did not change dramatical-
ly. In 2009, the new programme did not receive funding, and 39 cases 
of hate crime were investigated, which was half the 2010 number. Ac-
cording to the report, compensations paid to victims of discrimina-
tion were either insufficient or not provided at all.14 
All this seems to be a logical consequence of the events of the 
1990s. On October 6, 1990, Lithuania’s Poles attempted to establish a 
Polish national region as part of the country. This sparked a strong 
reaction from Lithuanians, and Poles were accused by the Prosecu-
tion Service of an illegal attempt to establish an autonomy. Later, the 
conflict was resolved, and Polish Lithuanians were granted the right 
to use their language in minority-dominated areas. However, in the 
documents, their names had to be spelt using Lithuanian orthogra-
phy. The latter only aggravated the conflict, so did the constant 
promises of Lithuanian president to solve the problem. None of these 
promises was ever fulfilled [11]. 
Despite Lithuania’s and Poland’s membership in the same in-
ternational alliances, a common historical background, and the unit-
ing factor of the Russian ‘threat’, the governing institutions of Lithu-
ania supplement their policy of national cohesion with practices that 
are discriminatory against other ethnic groups. This has a negative 
effect on both relations with minorities and the minority’s attitudes to 
state institutions As a result, the ‘countries of origin’ are given an op-
portunity to exert influence on minorities. In particular, this is done 
by Polish NGOs. 
Moreover, Lithuania’s policy towards ethnic minorities points to an 
interesting feature of this state, namely, to the fact that different aspects 
of liberal democracy develop unevenly in the process of nation-
building. The state promotes the institutional aspect of democracy (in 
our case, a competitive political party system) and yet hinders the lib-
eral aspect by imposing a restriction on diversity (ethnic diversity). 
 
Poland’s and Lithuania’s Polish minority: channels of influence 
 
There are over twenty active Polish non-governmental organi-
sations (NGOs) in Lithuania.15 NGOs are a principal channel of Polish 
                                                     
14 Country Reports on Human Rights Practicies, 2010 // Bureau of De-
mocracy, Human Right and Labor, U.S. Department of State. С. 13-21, availa-
ble at: https://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2010/eur/154435.htm 
(accessed 2 November 2018). 
15 http://www.3sektorius.lt/trecias-sektorius/nvo-duomenu-baze/ 
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influence on the diaspora in Lithuania. In ‘catering’ to the Polish mi-
nority, these NGOs do not cooperate with the Polish state and isolate 
themselves from it. 
As early as 1998, the Republic of Lithuania and the Republic of 
Poland signed an agreement on cooperation in culture, education, 
and science. Both parties planned to develop collaborations by in-
volving NGOs in cooperation in these fields. They pay attention to 
the problems of national minorities in both countries.16 According to 
the agreement, NGOs had to act in partnership with the state, on 
whose territory they operated. However, this did not happen. Most 
NGOs either did not cooperate with the government of Lithuania or 
kept this cooperation to a formal minimum. 
NGOs operating in Lithuania (not only Polish ones) are funded by 
the following sources:17 
 
 
Fig. NGO funging 
 
At least 10 % of NGOs are supported, in part or in full, by foreign 
funds. As of 2005, approximately half of NGOs operating in Lithua-
nia never submitted financial statements or reports. 
Many NGOs do not cooperate with Lithuania’s national insti-
tutions. These are charities, NGOs working at a district or interna-
tional level, organisations located in borderland cities (Vilnius, Mari-
jampolė, Alytus), and organisations fully financed from abroad. One 
organisation often falls into more than one category (which is often 
the case with Polish NGOs).18 
                                                     
16 1998, Lietuvos ir Lenkijos sutartis del bendradarbiavimo kulturos, svietimo ir 
mokslo srityje [Lithuania-Poland Treaty on Cooperation in Cultural, Edu-
cation and Scientific Spheres], available at: http://www.kpd.lt/lietuvos-
respublikos-vyriausybes-ir-lenkijos-respublikos-vyriausybes-sutartis-
del- bendradarbiavimo-kulturos-svietimo-ir-mokslo-srityje/ (accessed 29 
Au gust 2018). (In Lith.) 
17 Lithuania’s NGOs data base, available at: http://www.3sektorius.lt/tre 
cias-sektorius/nvo-duomenu-baze/ (accessed 10 August 2018). (In Lith.) 
18 Lithuania’s NGOs website, available at: http://www.3sektorius.lt (ac-
cessed 10 August 2018). (In Lith.); 2005, Lithuanian NGOs analisys, 
Nevyriasybiniu organizaciju informacijos ir paramos centras [NGOs in-
formation organization], pp. 31, available at: http://www.3sektorius. 
lt/docs/Treciojo_sektoriaus_instituciju_situacija_Lietuvoje1_2013-01-


















A number of ‘journals and magazines for Poles’ is published in 
Lithuania: 
1. Ausra/Auszra (since 1960)19; 
2. Ausrele (since 1998); 
3. Suvalkietis (since 1992”); 
4. Saltinis (1906—1915, since 2005); 
5. Demesio (since March 11, 1990, the day of restoration of inde-
pendence). 
Published in Polish and Lithuanian, these journals and magazines 
cover events that are of importance to all Poles and perform an edu-
cational function. Not all of them have online versions. The journals 
are brought together by common topics. In the absence of outright 
conflicts between Lithuania and Poland, these periodicals focus on 
cultural events.20 Overall, they try to avoid hot international topics 
and focus mainly on local affairs. 
This means that Polish NGOs in Lithuania operate quite suc-
cessfully without collaborating with the Lithuanian authorities. They 
use a wide range of means to establish a dialogue with the diaspora 
and to support it. Polish NGOs hold various events, provide social 
support for Lithuanian Poles, and back educational initiatives via the 
Polish-language media. They contribute to a stronger cohesion of the 
Polish diaspora in Lithuania, which translates into a stable and rather 
successful (if the proportion of Poles in the Lithuanian population is 
taken into account) performance of the Electoral Action of Poles in 
Lithuania in national, regional, and municipal elections. Polish NGOs 
working in Lithuania have a direct influence on election results by 
preserving the Polish identity of the diaspora and helping Lithuania’s 
ethnic Poles to defend their political interests at all levels. 
 
The EU factor and the problem of the Polish minority in Lithuania 
 
An important characteristic of transformation processes, which 
have been taking place in CEE over the past decades, is an unprec-
edented role of external actors — first of all, the European Union [12, 
p. 39—50, 43]. The countries of the region got a chance to accede to 
the EU after the execution of the European Union Association 
Agreement. A country’s eligibility for accession was defined by the 
                                                     
19 Ausra Journal website, available at: http://e-ausra.pl (accessed 8 Au-
gust 2018). (In Lith.) 
20 January 2018, Ausra Journal, no. 1 (746), available at: http://e-
ausra.pl/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/Ausra1.pdf (accessed 8 August 
2018). (In Lith.); August 2018, Ausra Journal, no. 15-16 (760-761), available 
at: http://e-ausra.pl/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/Ausra15.pdf (acces-
sed 8 August 2018). (In Lith.) 
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so-called Copenhagen criteria of 1992. A candidate country had to 
adopt the Community acquis (aquis communautaire) and apply the 
standards of an open democratic society and a rule-of-law state. 
These standards included respect for human rights and the protection 
of national minorities. 
The European Union has different types of influence when it 
comes to solving the problems of national minorities. Firstly, there is 
compulsory influence exerted through the Union’s conditionality pol-
icy. This influence is actor-driven and aimed at the policy-making 
level. Secondly, the EU has an enabling influence through political 
and financial mechanisms that strengthen the social actors who sup-
port desired changes in candidate countries. Thirdly, the EU has a 
connective influence by using a variety of mechanisms of increasing 
interconnections between countries and societies, bringing them closer 
together in border regions. This type of influence is oriented towards 
societies in a much stronger way than towards political or social actors. 
Finally, the EU has a constructive influence designed to foster deep 
changes in identification [2, p. 39—50, 43]. 
Guido Schwellnus, Lilla Balazs, and Liudmila Mikalayeva argue 
that the compulsory influence of the EU is crucial before a country’s ac-
cession to the EU at the stage when a candidate country tries to regu-
late its past conflicts and adopt laws on the protection of national mi-
nority rights. However, after accession, the strongest effect on conflict 
resolution is exerted by internal factors — primarily, the structure of 
political institutions [12]. For example, Poland supported Lithuania’s 
EU and NATO membership, and Lithuania adopted a law on national 
minorities. Accession to the EU was sufficiently important to both 
countries since they set aside bilateral conflicts. This way, the situation 
of Lithuania’s Polish minority became a latent problem. 
After Poland’s and Lithuania’s accession to the EU, the problem of 
the Polish minority has been approached constructively. According to 
Barbara Törnquist-Plewa and Magdalena Góra, the EU offers to its 
communities and citizens new arenas for expressing concerns and 
new frames of reference for the search for possible solutions, such as 
the European Parliament and European Commission [2, p. 47—48]. 
In March 2011, a lawyer from Gdansk, Tomasz Snarski, submitted 
a petition to the European Union. In his petition, Snarski raised the 
problem of the legal discrimination of the Polish minority manifested 
among other things in the inability to use first and last names in 
Polish, and the lack of official street and town signs in the native lan-
guage. In 2012, the European Parliament held a public hearing at 
which members of the Polish and Lithuanian governments were pre-
sent. The European Commission prepared two reports on the prob-
lem. The European Parliament sent letters to the Lithuanian authori-
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ties twice, asking for their comments on the situation.21 The Lithuani-
an authorities, in their turn, repeatedly ensured the European Parlia-
ment that all the necessary measures had been taken. In 2017, Snarski 
filed a second petition — this time, against the discrimination of 
Lithuanian Poles as regards their language rights and the right to ed-
ucation in their native language. As he put it: ‘until a Pole from Lith-
uania is not able to open his or her passport and see the name in 
his/her mother tongue, we cannot tell that we are caring about fun-
damental rights in the EU. This situation should not arise in the 21st 
century’.22 The future of the petition depends on support from mem-
bers of the European Parliament and their subsequent decision. So 
far, it has been expectedly supported by EP members of Polish origin. 
Alongside the European Parliament and the EU Commission, an 
important channel of influence is bringing the matter to the European 
Court of Justice. A court action seeking the recognition of the right of 
Lithuanian Poles to spell their names using Polish orthography in 
identity documents was filed (the Runevič-Vardyn case). However, in 
2011, the court ruled that the Lithuanian spelling of Polish names did 
not contradict the EU laws [13, 14]. 
The EU cannot expedite a solution to this problem because of the 
weak European identity of Lithuanian Poles. Numerous surveys show 
that European identity is not considered important by respondents from 
Lithuania’s Polish diaspora, the only exception being Poles with higher 
education. For all the respondents, European identity ranks much lower 
than their regional and national identities [15, p. 11]. Therefore, it is 
probable that Lithuanian Poles who are dissatisfied with the status quo 
will be inclined to solve problems by appealing to either the Lithuanian 
or Polish authorities rather than to the EU institutions. 
The problem of Lithuanian Poles was not solved automatically 
when the two countries acceded to the EU. The EU allows com-
munities suffering from oppression or discrimination to raise aware-
ness of their problems [2, p. 47—48]. Moreover, the EU as a normative 
force [16, p. 45—60], uses its conditionality policy and its attractive-
ness for non-member states (a chance of accession has turned into a 
powerful political tool) to prevent conflicts between majorities and 
minorities in new member states from deteriorating. In other words, 
                                                     
21 2015, European Parliament about discrimination of Polish people in 
Lithuania, EFHR Media, available at: http://media.efhr.eu/2015/05/ 
04/european-parliament-about-discrimination-of-polish-people-in-lithua 
nia-2/ (accessed 30 August 2018). 
22 2017, Situation of polish minorities in Lithuania is a discrimination of 
EU citizens, EFHR Media, available at: http://media.efhr.eu/2017/05/ 
09/situation-polish-minorities-lithuania-discrimination-eu-citizens/ (ac-
cessed 30 August 2018). 
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by making conflicts more transparent, the EU manages to keep them 
at bay (although it is not always the case). At the same time, the very 
nature of the EU as a political system, in particular, its restrictions on 
using any forms of coercion, limits the influence that the EU could 
have on resolving minority problems in member states. 
 
The ‘Russian factor’, Lithuanian Russians and Poles:  
an unexpected alliance 
 
Lithuanian Russians are the second largest minority in Lithuania, 
comprising 5.8 % of the total population. The other ethnic groups are 
much less numerous. However, Lithuania’s Russian minority is much 
smaller than those in Latvia and Estonia are. After the demise of the 
USSR, the Lithuanian authorities adopted a much more favourable 
attitude towards the ethnic group than their counterparts from the 
other two Baltic States did [17]. Surveys show that most Lithuanian 
Russians (80 %) attach importance to their ethnic identity [18, p. 9]. 
Ethnic Russians live primarily in cities — Visasginas, Klaipeda, and 
Vilnius. The minority consists of two major groups. The first one 
comprises descendants of Old Believers who moved from the Russian 
Empire to the Grand Duchy of Lithuania in the 18th century to escape 
persecution. The second group brings together descendants of Rus-
sians who moved to the Lithuanian SSR from other regions of the So-
viet Union after World War II [19, pp. 4—5]. 
One could expect tensions between Poland and Russia to affect re-
lations between the Polish and Russian minorities in Lithuania. How-
ever, this is not the case. The two ethnic groups collaborate on a wide 
range of issues. Experts call it a ‘strange friendship’ [20]. Surveys 
demonstrate that non-Lithuanians (including Poles) prefer the Rus-
sian media to the Lithuanian media. At the same time, 61 % of the 
country’s national minorities watch Russian television at least once a 
day. The same survey reveals a remarkable picture: national minori-
ties show greater support for Russia’s policy than the Lithuanian ma-
jority does. Only 16 % of minority respondents blame Russia for the 
conflict in Ukraine, as compared to 55 % among the Lithuanian ma-
jority [21]. These results are confirmed by other polls. For example, a 
survey held in 2017 shows that 64 % of Lithuanian Poles sympathise 
with President Putin and 40.5 % view the incorporation of Crimea as 
legitimate.23 Moreover, the Russian and Polish national minorities ral-
ly together against linguistic and educational discrimination by the 
                                                     
23 2011, Russians join Poles for minority protest in Lithuania, Radio Po-
land, available at: http://www.thenews.pl/1/10/Artykul/55673,Rus 




Lithuanian authorities.24 Some Lithuanian and Polish experts main-
tain that the central problem of Lithuanian Poles is neither spelling 
nor the demands of teachers from Polish schools but the Russification 
of the country’s Polish minority [20]. 
Here, two questions arise. How did it happen and what can be 
done? Some Polish experts blame the Lithuanian and Polish authorities 
for the ‘isolation’ of the Polish minority from the ‘country of origin’ 
and for the gravitation of the ethnic group towards the Russian minori-
ty and Russia. According to Daniel Boćkowski, ‘the existing Lithuanian 
politics towards minorities is not a road to nowhere, but a road to 
complete disaster. Because if people really do not identify themselves 
with Lithuania, it is not because they suddenly got offended, but be-
cause the policy concerning the use of language, culture, the economic 
policy, property issues …, resulted in the feeling of rejection’ [21]. By 
neglecting the legitimate demands of minorities and avoiding a clear 
policy towards them, the Lithuanian authorities encourage cooperation 
between minorities seeking to solve common problems. 
On the other hand, concerned with problems and tensions in Po-
land, Warsaw views the problems of Polish minorities as a secondary 
one. Poland lacks an effective Eastern policy, and this is a big strate-
gic mistake. At the same time, Polish experts admit that Russia de-
fends its minorities more effectively, and the country’s propaganda 
works better too. Both the Polish and Russian minorities are rejected 
by the Lithuanian majority. As a result, conflicts escalate [21]. 
To improve the situation, it is necessary for Warsaw to revise com-
pletely its policy towards Lithuanian Poles. With the Lithuanian au-
thorities lacking an active stance, Warsaw is ‘the only viable force’.25 
The Polish-Lithuanian bilateral relations are another important factor 
since conflicts in one field have a tendency to spread to others. The 
more serious the Polish—Lithuanian conflict, the fewer chances there 
are that the problem of Lithuanian Poles will have a solution in the 
near future. At the same time, Warsaw’s massive support for the Polish 
minority in Lithuania may spark a reaction from Vilnius. 
Lithuania’s attitude to the problem is much more reserved. Most 
Lithuanian politicians do not consider the Polish and the Russian mi-
norities as catalysts of political tensions and believe that the minority 
situation in the country is much better than in other post-Soviet states. 
According to a member of the Seimas, Arvydas Anušauskas, the Polish 
and the Russian minorities have different agendas: the Russians are 
closely integrated into Lithuanian society, and their primary concern is 
economic well-being, whereas the Poles are ‘isolating’ themselves from 
the rest, and the issues they raise may transform into open political 
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demands [22]. A Lithuanian political scientist, Vytautas Dumbliauskas, 
maintains that the mindset of Russians in Lithuania differs from that of 
Russians in Russia in being more Western. Lithuanian Russians see the 
benefits of living in the European Union, namely, freedom of move-
ment and career opportunities. Therefore, their primary focus is on 




After the disintegration of the Soviet Union, Lithuania and Poland 
managed to find common ground for developing good-neighbourly 
relations. However, this does not mean that all problems have been 
solved. One of them is the situation of Lithuania’s Polish minority — 
an important factor in the politics, economy, and social life of the state. 
In striving to complete the process of nation-building and to attain full 
statehood, the Lithuanian government employs measures that discrim-
inate ethnic groups. In doing so, it ignores the fact that Lithuania and 
Poland are members of the same international alliances. 
The treatment of the ethnic minority problem by the Lithuanian 
state reveals an important feature of the emergence and evolution of 
the country’s political system. This is the uneven development of var-
ious aspects of liberal democracy. The state promotes the institutional 
aspect of democracy (in our case, a competitive political party sys-
tem) and yet hinders the liberal aspect by imposing a restriction on 
diversity (ethnic diversity, in our case). At the same time, the Lithua-
nian state and Polish agents of civil society (who serve as a primary 
link between the minority and the ‘country of origin’) function inde-
pendently of each other. 
Lithuania’s and Poland’s EU membership did not solve the prob-
lem of the Polish minority by default. However, the EU factor mitigates 
the problem by making relations more transparent and creating new 
channels for minorities to express themselves at the supranational lev-
el. The EU factor played a very important role before the two countries’ 
accession to the Union. Today, its influence is limited. The Russian fac-
tor operates differently. Tensions between Poland and Russia do not 
affect relations between the Polish and Russian minorities in Lithuania. 
On the contrary, the two ethnic groups collaborate on a wide range of 
issues. Overall, external rather than internal factors will have the major 
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